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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
An ex-post evaluation was conducted of the 2008 Lower Burdekin Water Quality Tender 
(Tender). The 2008 Lower Burdekin Water Quality Tender had been the first NRM program 
in the GBR catchment to allocate funding for on-farm projects delivering water quality 
improvements through a competitive tender process. The Tender had attracted 87 bids from 
64 landholders for a range of water quality improvement proposals, mostly for reducing 
sediment, nutrient, herbicide and pesticide emissions from cane land. The funding scope of 
the Tender of approximately $600,000 had been allocated to fund the top 33 bids, from 32 
landholders. The allocative efficiency of the Tender has been assessed previously, based on 
the theoretical evaluation of bids (Rolfe et al., 2011b), but no retrospective assessment of 
tender efficacy has to date been conducted. 
 
The ex-post evaluation pursued two principal objectives. It sought to explore the legacy of 
the Tender, in particular its enduring benefits for water quality in the GBR. It also sought to 
glean any other lessons that could inform the design of future tender-based environmental 
funding programs. The dual purpose required a structured collation of the experiences by 
Tender participants as they related to the Tender. It also necessitated a review of the 
implementation and longevity of investments, and an examination of additionality and 
crowding effects of the Tender.  
 
For the ex-post evaluation, a survey was implemented using a mixed-method approach. 
Structured interviews were conducted of 42 Tender participants who had submitted a total of 
64 bids. Respondents and their bids provided a good statistical fit with the Tender 
participants and bids. Of respondents, 22 received funding (no more than one successful 
proposal per respondent) while 20 respondents did not have a successful proposal.  
 
The research found a high level of persistence of investments and continuing functionality, 
which means that water quality benefits continue to accrue. The Tender achieved 
additionality and crowding-in effects, which improved the efficiency of the investment. In 
particular, the research provided evidence that the Tender: 
§ Engaged in an information and communications strategy which generated high levels 
of participant satisfaction during Tender implementation, but once funding decisions 
were made the level of transparency and communication became less satisfactory; 
§ Incentivised the participation of many farmers who had not previously done anything 
about water quality or participated in any NRM programs; 
§ Effected learning about the impacts of agriculture on water quality—irrespective of 
success of proposals—and thereby generated intrinsic motivation for many Tender 
participants to be wanting to do more about improving water quality; 
§ Sparked a series of subsequent investments into water quality improvements, many 
of which were entirely funded by the farmers while others were undertaken with the 
assistance of other NRM funding programs; and  
§ Triggered and/or facilitated farming-systems change to more environmentally benign 
practices in some instances. 
 
This report concludes with recommendations regarding the design and implementation of 
future competitive tenders, NRM programs and policies, and research.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been growing interest in and application of ‘market-based instruments’ (MBIs) to 
incentivise pro-environment behaviour. MBIs, sometimes described as “economic 
instruments”, seek to bring market opportunities and processes into areas that have been 
traditionally managed by government regulation, information and education. MBIs are 
grounded in the notion that environmental problems, such as water pollution, biodiversity loss 
and climate change, are the result of market failure because many environmental goods and 
services are public goods. It is argued, that if it is possible to design and implement markets 
or market-like mechanisms, then this failure can be addressed in many situations (Lockie, 
2010). The underlying belief is that MBIs will make conservation financially attractive to the 
private sector.  
 
In comparison to traditional regulatory or command-and-control approaches, MBIs offer the 
potential to achieve environmental outcomes more efficiently by providing decision makers—
individuals, households and firms—with a rationale on which to make decisions that are in 
both their own and the public interest (Lockie, 2013; Stavins, 2003). MBIs increase flexibility 
and adaptability to changes in conditions (Windle et al., 2005).  
 
There is an extensive list of MBIs and they are typically classified into three types of 
mechanisms: market friction, price-based and rights-based (Lockie, 2013; OECD, 2007; 
Stavins, 1998).  
 
In the context of water pollution from agricultural activity, price-based MBIs which provide 
financial incentives for land-use change are most likely to induce a decline in nutrient load 
(Armour et al., 2009; Hunter and Walton, 2008). From an investor perspective, the efficiency 
of investment can be increased if the level of financial incentive is determined in a 
competitive process, through a competitive tender or reverse auction (Windle and Rolfe, 
2008). Scarce resources can then be allocated to those bids which provide the greatest 
environmental benefit per dollar of funding.  
 
Environmental tenders are becoming an increasingly popular policy instrument, as evidenced 
by recent implementation of ‘reverse auctions’ to achieve water quality improvements in the 
GBR and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. These tenders are designed and based on 
economic theory and in the absence of a comprehensive body of ex-post evaluations of past 
tender programs. This project reviews one environmental tender program, a water quality 
tender trial, so that lessons learnt from observations can complement economic theory and 
help inform the design of future tenders. 
 
In 2007-08, a Water Quality Tender (Tender) was trialled in the Lower Burdekin River area. It 
was jointly funded through the National MBI program and the National Heritage Trust 
Phase 2. Significant in-kind investment was also provided by the Qld Department of Primary 
Industries. The Tender provided approximately $600,000 in investment into water quality 
improvements, including infrastructure, machinery and other devices to help farmers reduce 
water pollution.  
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This report documents an ex-post evaluation of the Tender. The purpose of the evaluation 
was to ascertain:  
§ whether successful bids were fully implemented and have persisted and therefore 
continue to make a positive contribution to water quality in the GBR; 
§ whether proposed activities which did not receive funding at the time were 
implemented after 2008;  
§ whether participation in the Tender generated additional investment in water quality 
improvements and natural resource management more broadly; and 
§ what the experiences of participants were with respect to implementation and 
administration of the Tender. 
 
The significance of the research lies in its contribution to evidence-based policy and program 
development. Ex-post evaluations are particularly important to enable adaptation of 
environmental policies and programs, with empirical observations offering an important 
counterbalance to theory-based predictions (Herrick and Sarewitz, 2000). 
 
Insights and learning gleaned from empirical data can inform the design and implementation 
of future environmental tenders, MBIs and other policies and programs. This report 
summarises the research, providing a retrospective and systematic assessment of a “real-
life” MBI based on empirical evidence. This evidence generates important understanding as 
it complements the theory about MBIs and tenders. 
 
Section 2 of the report provides relevant context. The first part of this Section outlines the 
implementation process and theory underpinning the 2008 Lower Burdekin Water Quality 
Tender, and Tender outcomes. The second part introduces other elements of economic 
theory relating to the efficiency of public investment with specific reference to the use of 
competitive tenders as a vehicle for allocating such investment. This theory forms the basis 
for evaluating various facets that determine the efficiency of the Tender.   
 
Section 3 of the report outlines the methodological approach taken by the research and 
details methods. Section 4 provides and interprets the results. Section 5 offers a discursive 
evaluation of the research and its findings and Section 6 offers conclusions and 
recommendations.  
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2 RELEVANT CONTEXT 
2.1 The 2008 Lower Burdekin Water Quality Tender 
The Tender is described in detail in a series of research reports and publications (Greiner et 
al., 2008; Hailu et al., 2008; Rolfe et al., 2007a; Rolfe et al., 2011a; Rolfe et al., 2008; Rolfe 
et al., 2007b; Rolfe et al., 2007c; Windle et al., 2008). The following provides a brief synopsis 
to give relevant context for the ex-post evaluation.  
 
2.1.1 Geographical scale of the Tender 
In 2007-08, a Water Quality Tender (WQT) was conducted in the Lower Burdekin area, 
which takes in the Lower Burdekin River, Barratta Creek and Haughton River precincts within 
the Burdekin River Catchment (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map indicating area covered by the Tender  
 
 
2.1.2 Tender scope and process 
The Tender had a funding scope of approximately $600,000, which included funding 
provided by the Australian Government through the National Market Based Instruments 
Program, with additional funding provided by the NQ Dry Tropics under its Regional 
Investment Strategy. 
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The roll-out of the Tender followed the stages established by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort (1997) and Stoneham et al. (2003): 
§ Details of the Tender were publicised and promoted (August 2007).  
§ Landholders could register by completing an Expression of Interest form (September 
to November 2007).  
§ Landholders who submitted and Expression of Interest received a visit from extension 
and tender design staff to identify suitable projects and explain the process 
(September to December 2007).  
§ Landholders submitted bids (January 2008).  
§ Bids were evaluated and assessed (February to March 2008).  
§ Landholders were informed of the outcomes, and contracts drawn up with successful 
applicants (April 2008). 
 
The Tender attracted 87 bids for a range of water quality improvement proposals. Bids were 
drawn from landholders across the sugar cane and grazing industries from across the entire 
Lower Burdekin area. The majority of submissions (78) were for activities on cane land, and 
a further nine were for grazing land management. Of the proposed activities on cane land, 
nine related to pesticide reductions, ten were about fertilizer management, 22 were about 
water management and 41 related to the construction or expansion of water recycle pits. 
There were a variety of infrastructure, earthworks and machinery-related proposals, 
including:  
§ pipes and drains  
§ irrigation technology: trickle and drip irrigation, centre pivot, lateral move irrigators 
§ machinery and tools: bed formers, legume planters, stool splitters, shielded and 
hooded sprayers 
§ improved information: GPS, enviro-scans, weather station, satellite imagery, laptop 
computer, EM mapping 
§ laser levelling.  
 
There were 64 applicants. Some farmers submitted multiple bids, with ten farmers submitting 
two bids each, three submitting three bids each and one applicant submitted four and 
another applicant five bids.  
 
Each bid contained a description of the proposed activity, total cost estimate and a dollar-
value bid price. The bid price was the funding request. Bid prices ranged from $1,500 to 
$130,000, with an average of $25,131 and median value of $14,800. In total, the bids asked 
for $2.2 million in funding and consequently exceeded available funding by almost four times. 
Figure 2 shows the bids in order of increasing bid price. The figure illustrates that landholder 
contributions varied widely with relative contributions ranging from zero to multiple times the 
bid price. 
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Figure 2: Tender bid values, landholder contribution and bid price, ranked by bid price 
(Greiner et al., 2008)  
 
 
2.1.3 Assessment of bids 
To establish which bids should be funded, their relative merit was established. An evaluation 
process assessed each bid in terms of the marginal benefits in emissions that would result 
from the proposed action. Emissions included sediments, nutrients and herbicides/pesticides. 
Also considered were: 
• area of land or drainage involved; 
• soil type (cane only); 
• rate of off-farm movement into ground water and surface runoff (cane only); 
• fertilizer and pesticide application rates (cane only); 
• capacity of recycle pits or other interception structures; 
• number of years benefits would continue for (maximum of five); 
• type of farming systems involved; 
• future intentions of landholder; 
• rainfall (grazing only); 
• current land condition (grazing only); and 
• slope (grazing only).  
 
To assess the water quality benefit embodied in each bid, a metric estimated the pollution 
reduction for each bid by pollutant relative to the 2013 pollution reductions target for the 
Lower Burdekin. This resulted in an Environmental Benefits Score (EBS) for each bid. Bids 
were subsequently ranked in terms of their attractiveness, i.e. the estimated efficiency of 
investment as represented by unit of EBS per dollar of investment asked. 
 
The cumulative bid curve (Figure 3) shows bids ranked in decreasing order of attractiveness. 
The curve exhibits the classic ‘hockey stick’ pattern as shown by Stoneham et al. (2003). 
Greiner, R. 
6 
From the 87 bids received, the 33 most cost-effective bids were selected for $604,939 in total 
funding. These bids had a cumulative EBS of 2.73. The successful bids in the Tender were 
predicted to achieve the following emission reductions: 
• 491.8 tons of sediment reduction for $89.22 per ton, 
• 96,207 kg nitrogen reduction for $4.55 per kg, and 
• 55.6 kg Pesticide reduction for $2,221 per kg. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Tender bid curve with cumulative bids and environmental benefits index 
(Greiner et al., 2008)  
 
 
There was no clear pattern as to what type of proposed activities generated the lowest or 
highest bids, or what size bids provided the most attractive options. 
 
 
2.2 Factors determining efficiency of public investment in 
environmental improvements using MBIs 
Efficiency of investment is an important criterion for the evaluation of MBIs (Greiner et al., 
2000). Among MBIs, competitive tenders are particularly geared towards maximising 
allocative efficiency. In the context of public investment into water quality improvement, 
tenders maximise allocative efficiency of investment by exploiting the heterogeneity of cost 
between farmers to deliver improvements (Rolfe et al., 2008). Put simply, tenders maximise 
the ‘purchase’ of environmental outcome per unit of investment by ranking bids according to 
their efficiency and choosing the most efficient bids for funding—as shown in Figure 3.  
There are, however, other aspects to consider when assessing the efficiency of investment, 
in particular whether a program achieves additionality and generates crowding effects. 
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The efficiency of investment is increased if it achieves additionality. Additionality means that 
a policy or program achieves outcomes in addition to those that would have occurred in the 
absence of the policy or program (Sierra and Russman, 2006). The efficiency of incentive 
payments is diminished if payments are provided for practices that would have been adopted 
anyway (Sierra and Russman, 2006). 
 
The efficiency of investment is also increased if the mechanism reinforces people’s intrinsic 
motivation to contribute to making environmental improvements. In environmental economics 
literature there is ongoing debate whether MBIs serve to reinforce (“crowd in”) or undermine 
(“crowd out”) landholders’ intrinsic motivations to invest in environmental improvements. 
Crowding out theory suggests that an external intervention via monetary incentives or 
punishments tends to undermine intrinsic motivation, i.e. that it reduces a person’s inherent 
propensity to engage in socially desirable behaviour by introducing a financial motif (Frey 
and Jegen, 2001). Indeed, in a recent review of empirical studies into payments for 
biodiversity conservation, Rode et al. (2015) found more evidence of monetary incentives 
causing crowding out compared to crowding in effects.  
 
In the context of conservation tenders, it has been experimentally shown that the introduction 
and subsequent removal of a conservation auction significantly reduces voluntary provision 
of environmental quality, compared to a control group that does not experience an auction 
(Kits et al., 2014).  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Ex-post program evaluation 
To assess the legacy of the Tender, the research adopted an ex-post program evaluation 
approach. Program evaluation is the “systematic collection of information about the activities, 
characteristics, and results of programs to make judgments about the program, improve or 
further develop program effectiveness, inform decisions about future programming and/or 
increase understanding” (Patton, 2008, p.39). Evaluation is a process of systematic collation 
of information, focused on specific issues, for a variety of possible uses and judgements. 
Following Rossi et al. (2004), evaluation involves applied science using social research 
methods.  
 
The evaluation took place within the specific context provided by the Tender, and with 
specific emphasis on the permanency of change achieved and crowding-in or crowding-out 
effects generated. The evaluation specifically explored: 
§ whether successful bids were fully implemented and have persisted and therefore 
continue to make a positive contribution to water quality in the GBR; 
§ whether proposed activities which did not receive funding at the time were 
implemented after 2008;  
§ whether participation in the Tender generated additional investment in water quality 
improvements and natural resource management more broadly; and 
§ what the experiences of participants were with respect to implementation and 
administration of the Tender. 
 
 
3.2 Survey of Tender participants 
3.2.1 Ethical conduct 
All aspects of survey design and implementation adopted social research best practice and 
adopted the five ethical responsibilities towards survey participants, namely voluntary 
participation, informed consent, no harm, confidentiality and privacy (De Vaus, 2002).  
 
The Executive Review Committee of James Cook University granted ethics approval H6327 
on 18 September 2015 for the survey to proceed. It approved the informed consent form and 
information sheet (Appendix 1).  
 
3.2.2 Survey sample 
The sample frame for the research was pre-determined to include the landholders in the 
Lower Burdekin region, who had participated in the Tender. NQ Dry Tropics, as the 
administrating body of the Tender and partner agency in this research, provided the contact 
details of 64 landholders to the researcher, including details of the proposals they had 
submitted to the Tender. Consequently, the sample frame was 64 landholders. 
 
Given the small sample frame, the intention was to contact every Tender participant, 
provided they could be contacted by telephone. To maximise the likelihood of Tender 
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participants agreeing to participate in the survey and to address privacy law considerations, 
NQ Dry Tropics mailed an information letter to Tender participants to inform them of the 
research and advise them that they would be contacted by the researcher. A copy of the 
letter is shown in Appendix 2.  
 
It was anticipated that a sample of 30 interviews would allow some basic descriptive analysis 
of structured response data and would also constitute an ‘adequate sample size’ from the 
perspective of qualitative research (Sandelowski, 1995) by achieving informational 
redundancy. 
 
3.2.3 Conducting interviews 
Interviews were conducted during November 2015. Tender participants were contacted by 
telephone if a contact telephone number could be established. For most participants, a 
contact number was given in the NQ Dry Tropics data base. A White Pages and Yellow 
Pages search of missing telephone numbers in the data base was conducted. If no contact 
telephone could be established, or if incorrect numbers could not be rectified, Tender 
participants were not contacted. No less than four attempts were made at contacting every 
Tender participant for whom a correct telephone number was available. Where possible, a 
voice message was left, but on no more than two occasions, with a call-back number. 
 
If contact could be made, and Tender participants agreed to participate in the survey, they 
were given a choice between completing the survey over the telephone or by face-to-face 
interview. Mixed-mode methodology can help to increase the response rate of a survey 
(Dillman et al., 2009). If respondents chose telephone interview, a suitable time for the 
interview was established. If they chose face-to-face interview, the preferred interview 
location and a suitable time were arranged. 
 
Telephone interviews took between 15—30 minutes to complete, face-to-face interviews 
between 30—45 minutes. 
 
Given the 7-year interval between the Tender and this survey, it was important to maximise 
data integrity by ensuring respondents recalled the Tender in as much detail as possible. 
Respondents’ recall and their ability provide accurate and useful information was enhanced 
by the mail-out information letter. In addition, at the beginning of each interview, the 
researcher confirmed with the respondent the accuracy of the data contained in the Tender 
data base relating to activities proposed and success of bid(s), and provided a summary of 
the key process elements and dates of the Tender.  
 
3.2.4 The questionnaire 
The survey was based on a questionnaire, which consisted of two sections. Section 1 
explored aspects relating to the Tender. Section 2 established respondent-specific socio-
economic and attitudinal information. Some questions in Section 1 only applied to successful 
Tender participants. A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
 
The questions that applied to successful Tender participants only asked: 
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§ Whether any difficulties were encountered in fulfilling the contract—specifically in 
relation to cost—and if and how these were resolved; 
§ How satisfied respondents were with the performance of the investment; 
§ Whether the investment had served as a learning opportunity for others; and 
§ Whether the investment had yielded financial benefits. 
 
For unsuccessful Tender participants, the questionnaire explored, inter alia, 
§ Whether any of the proposed activities were undertaken in the absence of the 
requested payment. 
 
The questionnaire also ascertained: 
§ Socio-demographic information of the respondent; 
§ Property and land-use related information; 
§ Whether respondents used the GBR for fishing or recreation; 
§ Stated intention to participate in the forthcoming nitrogen reverse auction; and 
§ Attitudinal responses to a variety of statements. 
 
Principles of effective attitudinal survey design were followed in the construction of questions 
and response formats (Creswell, 2009; De Vaus, 2002; Krosnick and Fabrigar, 1997; 
Krosnick and Presser, 2010).  
 
To enable descriptive and analytical statistics to be performed on the survey data, each 
question was initially asked by a closed question, which typically required binary (yes/no) or 
scaling responses. A five-point response scale was adopted for some questions to provide a 
good measure of intensity, extremity and direction and also enable treatment of variables as 
ordinal data for parametric data analysis (Zar, 1984). For example, respondents were asked 
to state their level of agreement from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. 
 
To maximise the explanatory power of the survey, most closed questions were followed by 
an open-ended question to prompt respondents to provide as much detail and illustration 
about any question as they were willing to share. The final survey question provided scope 
for respondents to provide suggestions they deemed relevant for policy and program 
development.  
 
Due to the small sample frame no pre-testing of the survey was conducted and all responses 
were included in the data analysis.  
 
 
3.3 Coding and data analysis 
The surveys were coded in MS Excel©. Data verification was conducted on 100% of the 
sample. Descriptive analysis of quantitative data was performed in MS Excel© and/or 
Stata©, and advanced analysis was undertaken in Stata©. 
 
Quantitative analysis of the data was undertaken within the constraints of the small sample 
size and with the intention of complementing the qualitative insights provided by survey 
respondents. 
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Key descriptive measures including minimum, maximum, median, average and frequencies 
are reported. Post-hoc comparison between the successful and unsuccessful Tender 
participants was done using t-test for continuous variables, Mann Whitney test for ordinal 
data and Fisher’s exact test for binary data (Motulski, 1995; StataCorp, 2013a). Associations 
between variables associated with socio-demographic covariates were explored using 
correlation analysis for continuous covariates, Mann Whitney test for ordinal data and 
Fisher’s exact test for binary data (Motulski, 1995; StataCorp, 2013a). Statistical analysis 
was conducted in Stata13® (StataCorp, 2013b). 
 
The alpha level for interpretation of statistical significance was set at p<0.05 unless otherwise 
stated. Testing for associations was undertaken systematically and results are reported 
where statistically significant results were found. 
 
Qualitative data were grouped and organised to support interpretation of quantitative survey 
results. Respondent identifiers are shown where qualitative responses are shown in the 
report. Identifiers indicate the success of respondents in the Tender. A number commencing 
with ‘2’ indicates that the respondent had one successful bid, ‘4’ indicates one unsuccessful 
bid, ‘3’ indicates multiple bids of which one was successful, ‘5’ indicates multiple 
unsuccessful bids. 
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4 RESULTS 
4.1 Sample, response rate and representation 
Of the 64 Tender participants given in the data base, which formed the sample frame,  
19 could not be contacted. Reasons for non-contact included: participant was deceased; no 
telephone contact number could be obtained; participant could not be contacted after at least 
four attempts. Of the 45 Tender participants who could be contacted, three declined to 
participate in the research.  
 
The sample size was 42 respondents, or 66% of the tender frame, and the response rate 
was 93%. Of respondents, only two requested a face-to-face interview, the remaining 40 
preferred to be interviewed over the telephone. 
 
The survey participation statistics are shown in Table 1. The 42 respondents had submitted a 
total of 59 bids in the Tender, which was 68% of bids submitted in 2008. Of respondents, 33 
had submitted one bid, five had submitted two bids, two had submitted three bids and one 
respondent, each, had submitted four and five bids. Of one-bid respondents, 15 had been 
successful and 17 had not received funding. Of respondents with multiple bids, two had all 
bids declined while seven had one of their bids funded.  
 
Table 1: Survey participation: representation of Tender participants and bids 
 
 
 
The 59 bids provided a representative sample, which included all types of water quality 
improvement measures that had been proposed, and including a majority of activities on 
cane farms and two on grazing land. The sample showed a very good match with the Tender 
on basic value statistics (Table 2). The average value of proposed actions in the sample was 
$51,550, which was 4.5% higher than the average value of proposed actions in the sample 
frame. Average bid value in the sample was $24,813, which was 1.3% lower than average 
bid value in the sample frame. Median bid value in the sample was $15,000, which was 1.3% 
higher than the median in the sample frame. 
 
Sample 
frame 
(Tender)
Sample 
(this 
research)
Survey 
represen-
tation       
(%)
Number of bids 87 59 68%
Number of Tender participants 64 42 66%
One bid - successful 20 15 75%
One bid - not successful 29 17 59%
Multiple bids - all successful 1 0 0%
Multiple bids - one successful 10 7 70%
Multipe bids - none successful 4 3 75%
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Table 2: Comparison of activity and bid values in survey frame and survey 
 
 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics of respondents 
Respondents were asked to provide basic socio-demographic details. The resulting overview 
is shown in Table 3. All respondents were male. The most prominent age bracket was 60-69 
years old and all respondents were at least 40 years old.  
 
Three quarters of respondents indicated that they had completed high school, and one-in-five 
had undertaken tertiary studies relevant to agriculture. More than 80% of respondents had 
completed agriculture-related technical training courses and industry-relevant courses such 
as “6 easy steps”.  
 
Table 3: Respondents’ socio-demographic attributes 
 
 
 
 
Tender Sample Tender Sample
(N=87) (N=59) (N=87) (N=59)
Average $49,310 $51,550 $25,131 $24,813
Median $28,000 $25,000 $14,800 $15,000
Minimum $2,700 $3,000 $1,500 $1,500
Maximum $275,000 $275,000 $130,000 $102,091
Value of proposed 
activity ($)
Value of bid ($)
Attribute Category
Gender Male 100.0%
Female 0.0%
Age Younger than 30 years 0.0%
30-39 years 0.0%
40-49 years 10.3%
50-59 years 28.2%
60-69 years 38.5%
70 years and older 23.1%
Education (completed)
Primary school 97.6%
High school 76.2%
Tertiary education relevant to agriculture 21.4%
Tertiary education -- other 2.4%
Training and certificates relevant to agriculture 85.7%
Land and water 'best management' course(s) 31.0%
DPI / BSES and similar courses (e.g. 6 easy steps) 81.0%
Engaged in fishing / recreation in the GBR
Yes 71.4%
No 28.6%
Percentage of 
respondents (%)
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Almost three quarters of respondents indicated that they went fishing, at least occasionally, 
and/or diving and snorkelling in the GBR.  
 
All respondents managed family farms, with one exception, which was a corporation-owned 
property (Table 4). Property size ranged from 35 to 3500 ha with a median of 200 ha. Most 
farms had been in the same ownership for more than 40 years, some since settlement of the 
district. With two exception (grazing properties), all grew cane. Of respondents, two were 
graziers who did not grow crops. Of respondents growing cane, approximately half did grow 
other crops, including break crops or other crops such as cereal grains and rice.   
 
Table 4: Respondents’ property characteristics and land uses 
 
 
 
4.3 Completion and persistence of proposed activities 
4.3.1 Contracted Tender activities 
Respondents were asked whether they had completed the proposed activities they had 
received funding for. Of the 24 funded proposals, 83% were completed as per the contract 
resulting from the Tender. Three activities, which received funding, were never implemented 
and one was partially completed (Table 5). 
 
Of ten recycle pits, which received funding for construction only seven were completed. One 
recycle pit was only partially completed, with the earthworks completed but the pump not 
operational: 
“The pit is there but it [the pump] still needs hooking up. There have been 
problems with electricity.” R366 
 
Attribute Category Value
Farm size Average  467 ha
Median 200 ha
Minimum  34 ha
Maximum  3500 ha
Percentage of respondent properties (%)
Type of ownership
Family-owned 97.7%
Corporation-owned 2.3%
Length of ownership
less than 10 years 17.1%
10-19 years 14.6%
20-39 years 7.3%
40 years and more 61.0%
Land use Sugar cane 95.1%
Other crops (main and break crops) 43.9%
Horticulture 9.8%
Grazing 19.5%
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Table 5: Completion rates of successful Tender proposals (%) 
 
 
 
Construction of two recycle pits never commenced, principally because cost projections, 
which had underpinned the proposals, were found to be too low:  
“There was a cost blow-out. The power supply [to the pump] would have cost 
heaps more than planned.” R223 
“There were two reasons why it [the recycle pit] did not go ahead. Before we 
began digging there was a massive cost blow-out and also the neighbour, whose 
water the pit was going to capture, put a pit in of his own”. R202  
 
The installation of a lateral move irrigator also did not proceed following more detailed 
investigations into the proposed strategy. 
“We did additional research asking people who had them [lateral move irrigators], 
which showed that they did not have very good experiences”. R211  
 
The funded machinery included stool splitters, hooded sprayers, legume planters, a variable 
rate fertilizer applicator and GPS, all of which were purchased, and all of which are still in 
use.  
 
There were cost over-runs associated with the construction of most of the recycle pits, with 
only three recycle pits reportedly completed on budget. This reveals a tendency of proposals 
to underestimate the cost of major infrastructure projects.  
“It was twice as expensive [as planned].” R217 
“We needed to fix some issues, which caused additional expenses.” R221    
 
Of the funded and completed recycle pits and recycle pit extensions, all bar one were said to 
be operating as intended and to the satisfaction of respondents.  
“It’s the best thing I could have ever done. It captures all the runoff water, and all 
nutrients and pesticides. They [recycle pits] should be mandatory.” R203 
 
One recycle pit was not functioning well because it was losing water through deep drainage 
and not yielding recycled water. All of the machinery was said to be still in operation as 
intended, with one shielded sprayer requiring modifications initially to be functional.  
 
Respondents who had constructed recycle pits noted a variety of benefits: 
“I am fairly happy. It [recycle pit] is fully operational and I haven't done any 
additional work to it. It ensures that no tail water is leaving the farm, and no 
nutrients and chemicals.” R370 
Types of work Count Fully completed
Partially 
completed
Not 
implemented
New recycle pit 10 70% 10% 20%
Recycle pit modification 5 100%
Irrigation system 2 50% 50%
Machinery 7 100%
Total 24 83% 4% 13%
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“It [recycle pit] generates cost saving by being able to re-use the water you have 
already paid for. It also improves ease of management, you don't have to be 
worried about getting up at 4 am to turn off the pump.” R366 
“I recycle the whole lot. It delivers great water savings.” R369 
“It allows me to pump water from the pit cheaper than what I can buy water. I also 
get the waste water from other farms.” R209 
“It gives me ‘insurance’, most significantly in a dry year where I now have more 
options and am not 100% reliant on Sunwater.” R217 
“It has given us access to water that we would otherwise lose. It gives us more 
water, easier water management and improves farm productivity.” R370 
“The benefit [of the recycle pit] is not financial, but it has improved our farm 
sustainability.” R212 
 
Respondents who had purchased various types of machinery were also satisfied with their 
performance. 
“It eliminates the necessity to use pre-emergent herbicides.” R214 [shielded 
sprayer] 
“I decreased chemical usage by LOTS, and it is more time efficient. We were the 
first to get one. Many farmers have bought one since then.” R362 [hooded 
sprayer] 
“I don’t have to do as many passes and it causes less ground disturbance.” 
R204: [stool splitter] 
“The variable rate applicator is achieving what I was trying to achieve. It puts on 
the right amount of fertilizer to the right amount of yield.” R371 
 
Benefit rating of the funded activities was not statistically associated with whether or not their 
implementation had caused unexpected costs to the respondents. 
 
Successful respondents who had completed the contracted activity were asked whether 
other people, including other farmers and extension officers, had ever inspected the activity. 
Of 18 responses, ten were in the affirmative. All types of investments were reportedly 
inspected. This indicates that the Tender served to progress the adoption of water quality 
improvement innovations. 
 
4.3.2 Unsuccessful Tender proposals 
Respondents were asked whether they had undertaken the activities contained in 
unsuccessful proposals to the Tender. Of 35 proposals, almost three quarters were 
nevertheless subsequently implemented, across all types of water quality improvement 
measures (Table 6). 
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Table 6: Completion rates of unsuccessful Tender proposals (%) 
 
 
 
Many of the proposals were re-worked and then re-submitted when other funding 
opportunities emerged, and some were subsequently funded under various Reef Rescue 
programs. Many respondents who did not receive funding, either in the Tender or in 
subsequent funding rounds, proceeded to implement the proposed activities anyway.  
“I built it myself, a 10 ML [recycle] pit, and put the power to it. It cost me $40,000 
to build and $150,000 to put the power in.” R431 
“I did it off my own bat. It is one of the best recycle pits around and people come 
to look at it.” R432 
 
 
4.4 Respondents’ recollection of and experiences with the Tender 
4.4.1 Recollection of the Tender 
Despite the 7-year time lapse between the Tender and this research, all respondents 
indicated that they had at least a vague recollection of it, and more than 62% of respondents 
stated that they clearly remembered all or ‘most aspects’ of the Tender (Table 7). Indeed, in 
the majority of cases, respondents recalled key details of the process and their EOI(s), and 
the associated funding decision(s). However, approximately one quarter of respondents only 
had a vague recollection and required the interviewer to refresh their memories. 
 
Table 7: Respondents’ recollection of the Tender  
 
 
 
One respondent specifically noted:  
“I remember very clearly because at the time there was talk about government 
bringing in regulation. The tender was a great opportunity to prove things.” R203 
Types of work Count Fully completed
Partially 
completed
Not 
implemented
New recycle pit 9 67% 33%
Recycle pit upgrade/extension 6 50% 50%
Irrigation system 2 100%
Other infrastructure 4 50% 50%
Machinery 9 89% 11%
Other 5 100%
Total 35 74% 9% 17%
Recollection Proportion of respondents (%)
"Do not remember" 0%
"Remember vaguely" 24%
"Remember some detail" 14%
"Remember most aspects" 38%
"Remember clearly" 24%
Total 100%
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4.4.2 Satisfaction with Tender  
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they were generally satisfied with the way the 
Tender had been administered, in particular in terms of implementation of a competitive 
tender concept, and regarding the communication and explanation of the funding decisions. 
The results are summarised in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Respondent satisfaction with the Tender (proportion of respondents, %) 
 
 
 
Of respondents, almost three quarters indicated that they were satisfied with the manner in 
which the Tender had been run though the competitive concept which was novel to many. 
The Tender aspect, which attracted most comment, of a positive kind, was the farm visit and 
one-on-one consultation offered in the preparation of tailored expressions of interest (EOIs). 
Most respondents commented favourably on the Tender process, as illustrated by the 
following quotations. 
“I thought the tender was put together well.” R541 
“It was very good, straight forward. It was the first time I participated in a grant.” 
R368 
“Was run quite well, particularly given that it was the first time something like that 
was done.” R222 
“The people who guided me through it and filled out the paperwork were really 
good.” R215 
“People who had local knowledge helped put proposal together. They were not 
bureaucrats.” R203 
“The one-on-one was great. They looked at what I wanted to achieve and helped 
write the proposal.” R371 
“The one-on-one [was the best aspect]. The guy from Burdekin Dry Tropics was 
very practical.” R436 
“I liked the follow-up workshop and the $50 voucher.” R366 
“It [requirements for funding] could have been a bit harder” R211 
 
But not everyone had a positive recollection: 
“The process was laborious.” R440 
“The guys who came out to look at the proposal weren't really interested in 
understanding the proposal. All they wanted to do was sit under a tree.” R427 
“Nobody came out to discuss the EOIs.” R564 
 
Satisfaction
Implementation / 
administration of the 
Tender
Communication of 
Tender results
Number of responses 41 39
"Satisfied" 73% 28%
"Dissatisfied" 10% 44%
"Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied" 0% 3%
"Unsure" 17% 26%
Total 100% 100%
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Respondent satisfaction with the way the funding decisions had been communicated and 
explained was low, with only 28% of respondents stating they were satisfied with this aspect 
of the Tender. In many cases, positive ratings appeared explicitly aligned with the outcome of 
funding decisions. The following comments are illustrative for many similar comments. 
“I was happy that I got the money.” R202 
“My proposal was damn good. I would have been upset if I had not got the 
money.” R203 
 
Negative ratings tended to be given by respondents who had not received funding, or those 
who disliked other aspects of the Tender: 
“The amount of information that we had to supply was onerous.” R370 
“There was no explanation given [why I wasn't successful].” R420  
“There was no reason given why I didn't get the money.” R416 
“I didn’t' get an explanation why the other proposal was refused.” R367 
“I didn't get the funding and don't know why. Some people got a lot of money.” 
R450 
“There was no real feed-back, they just said it wasn't suitable. A lot of the money 
seemed to be going to the bigger growers.” R432 
“We got nothing. Nobody explained why not. I fail to understand how the [funding] 
decisions were made. It must have been political.” R564 
 
Some successful respondents were also critical of funding decisions. 
“To my mind, as an industry representative, there was an awful lot of money 
wasted on projects that were on the margins, while other projects, which would 
have delivered better water quality outcomes, were not funded. For example, 
several proposals for recycle pits from small farmers were not funded while other 
people got GPS for their tractors, with a questionable benefit for water quality.”  
R211 
 
Fisher’s exact analysis indicated that respondents with a successful Tender result were 
significantly more likely to be satisfied with both the process (p=0.001) and the 
communication of results (p=0.045). Respondents with a clearer recollection of the Tender 
were significantly more likely to state that they were satisfied with the Tender process 
(p=0.039). 
 
The concept of a competitive mechanism for allocation funding did not agree with everybody, 
irrespective of whether they received funding or not, but a positive funding decision appeared 
to hold the key to an overall positive assessment of the Tender. 
“It was a weird way of doing things; you got to bid for money.” R208 
“[I disliked] just the way it was done. You had to put in a figure. I didn't know what 
to put in. In the end, I was happy to get $15,000.” R208 
But:  “There wasn't anything to dislike. We were getting help and money for little effort.  
  It was a great thing.” R362 
“It [the tender] helped us implement something we could not have done 
otherwise.” R212 
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4.4.3 Reflections on the proposals  
Respondents were asked whether, if they could go back in time, they would change their 
Tender proposal. A majority of respondents (60%) answered in the affirmative.  
 
Of successful respondents, some indicated that they would increase their bids while others 
would have improved the technical specifications of their proposals:  
“I would have been more adventurous and asked for more money.” R208 
“I could have got a better seeder, an air seeder, which would be more modern 
and versatile.” R215 
“I would have done a bit more investigation and gone for bigger storage.” R217 
“I would ask for more money because it cost a whole lot more than budgeted.” 
R369 
 
Of respondents who had not been successful, many said they would put more effort into 
tailoring and articulating their proposals, while others resented the effort they put into 
preparing the proposal(s): 
“I would propose a different location.” R416 
“I would probably have more water capture, rather than just my own farm.” R431 
“I would employ a consultant to write a better proposal, and I would go for a 
bigger investment.” R422 
“I would lie about everything and not tell them the changes I had already made.” 
R427  
“I would not have wasted the time.” R564  
 
 
4.5 Changes attributable to the Tender 
4.5.1 Changes to farmers’ knowledge and farming systems  
Respondents were asked whether they thought participation in the Tender had firstly, 
changed their understanding about the relationship between agriculture and water quality, 
and secondly, had changed their farming system. Less than half of respondents thought that 
they had acquired new knowledge about how agriculture affected water quality by 
participating in the Tender. A majority of respondents (56%) indicated that as a consequence 
of the Tender their farming system had changed permanently (Table 9).  
 
Table 9: Changes to knowledge and farming systems (proportion of respondents, %) 
 
 
Response
Changed understanding 
of 'agriculture and 
water quality'
Changed land 
management and/or 
farming system
Number of responses 37 39
"No" 51% 44%
"Yes" 46% 56%
"Unsure" 3% 0%
Total 100% 100%
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Fisher’s exact test found no association between respondents’ success in the Tender and 
stated impact on understanding, but funding success was significantly positively associated 
with stated change of the farming system (p=0.001).  
 
Respondents who indicated that the Tender increased their awareness and understanding: 
“It helped me understand the downstream repercussions of on-farm action.” R202 
“It made me think about it [WQ].” R209 
“Brought it [WQ] to the forefront of my mind.” R211 
“It made me understand the financial benefits of water recycling.” R363 
“It opened my eyes to how much water I could save. And all this water doesn't go 
out to the Reef.” R369 
“Yes, at the time. It was the start of a big push for water quality. I am still to be 
convinced that all this money government is throwing at people for shielded 
sprayers etc. is making a difference. None of my water is leaving the farm. So 
how do I affect the reef?” R368 
 
Respondents who thought they had not learnt anything new commented:  
“It has not changed my understanding. Water has always been a big issue.” R212 
“I have always tried to do the right thing and I got salty underground water, so I 
am very conscious [of WQ]. It [the Tender] reinforced what I knew.” R431 
“I have always been very aware [of the impact on WQ], but getting the funding 
was a step to conserving water and keeping it in-house.” R221 
“I have always understood it, but doing something [to improve water quality] was 
always out of grasp. I get a nice fuzzy feeling from doing something good.” R362 
“It might have been so for other growers. I read anything and everything.” R420 
“I am a firm believer in water quality, have been all along.” R432 
“Over time, more growers have become aware because of media, workshops and 
industry forums.” R410 
 
Respondents commented on how funding received under the Tender helped them change 
their farming system: 
“You get into the mindset of WQ, next thing you start reducing fertilizer and use of 
pre-emergent [herbicides]…” R368 
“My system is changing constantly. I learn something new every day. 
Participating in the Tender got me on the way to Catalyst accreditation.” R221 
“We were heading down this road [to improving our farming systems], so the 
money helped.” R211 
“It has helped us on the pathway to a more holistic approach to farming.” R212 
“By getting the sprayer we changed spraying practices. I am now part of project 
Catalyst and progress groups.” R362 
“We have put in additional recycling pits and enviro-scan, which helps with 
scheduling of irrigation and reduces deep drainage.” R370 
“We have done lots of things, including getting GPS and a shielded sprayer. We 
have also changed the planter which reduced the need for ground preparation for 
plant cane.” R410 
“I did the recycle pit, without funding, then bought instruments to measure N and 
P in my tail water.” R420 
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“I am now doing 96% water recycling and also bought a GPS and new spray rig, 
so I use less Diuron.” R215 
“I spent $400,000 on water quality improvements—all our own money. I replaced 
concrete pipes and generated large water savings. I am monitoring water 
outflow.” R360 
 
4.5.2 Additionality effect: Tender participation 
To get an indication whether the Tender enticed people into taking water quality action, the 
survey ascertained whether proposals submitted to the Tender were the first water quality 
improvement activities that respondents had contemplated.  
 
Approximately two thirds of respondents indicated that they had not undertaken any 
(deliberate) action on their property to improve water quality prior to the Tender (Table 10), 
and only 21% of respondents stated that they had previously participated in a NRM program. 
This indicates that the Tender drew people into participation in a NRM program, and 
specifically incentivised investment in water quality improvement.  
“The subsidy gave an incentive to apply.” R412 
“Grants are a great way for people to do environmental improvements.” R209 
 
Table 10: Water quality action prior to Tender (proportion of respondents, %) 
 
 
 
Comments offered by respondents who had undertaken prior water quality actions included: 
“Not even close! I installed a recycling system 20 years ago and invested quite a 
bit of time and money since 1992.” R367 
“I implemented a recycle pit before it became fashionable and funding for this 
type of work became available.” R424 
“I had done a $150,000 investment in water capture before and had gone away 
from using Atrazine, Diuron and other chemicals.” R427 
“I installed a recycle pit previously and fenced off some swamps and riparian 
vegetation. R433 
“I bought the farm in 2006 and it already had two recycle pits on it.” R217 
 
Some respondent comments directly attested to of additionality effects of the Tender: 
“It [the tender] helped us implement something we could not have done 
otherwise.” R212 
“I could not have done it [recycle pit] without the funding.” R221 
 
Response "First" water quality improvement action
"First" NRM program 
participation
"No" 31% 21%
"Yes" 67% 79%
"Unsure" 2% 0%
Total 100% 100%
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4.5.3 Post-Tender additionality and crowding effects 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether subsequent to the Tender they undertook 
(further) water quality improvement activities on their property, or other natural resource 
management and conservation activities. The vast majority of respondents (88%) indicated 
that they undertook water quality improvement activities or investment following the Tender, 
while less than 30% of respondents engaged in other natural resource management or 
conservation activities since (Table 11). The rate of subsequent activity was not statistically 
associated with success in the Tender. 
 
Table 11: Post-Tender water quality and NRM action, by Tender success  
(proportion of respondents by category, %) 
 
 
 
Many respondents who had to date not undertaken additional WQ improvement activities 
indicated that they were either hoping to do so at some point in the future. 
 
Following the Tender, the vast majority of respondents (80%) participated in subsequent 
NRM and water quality programs and sought funding for (further) water quality improvement 
measures. There was no statistically significant association between success in the Tender 
and participation in subsequent funding programs (Table 12).  
Table 12: Number of Tender participants seeking subsequent NRM funding (count data) 
 
 
 
Statistical tests found only one relevant association with socio-demographic covariates. 
Respondents who had participated in industry-type training programs such as “Six Easy 
Steps” were significantly more likely to seek more NRM funding (Fisher’s exact test, 
p=0.020).  
 
But not everybody was looking for funding. The above list contains many examples of water 
quality investments that respondents made without receiving any financial assistance. 
Category: Success in the  Tender
Subsequently undertook 
water quality measures 
(% category)
Subsequently undertook 
other NRM or conservation 
activities (% category)
Total 
(count)
One successful proposal 93% 21% 14
One unsuccessful proposal 82% 41% 17
Multiple proposals, one successful 100% 14% 7
Multiple unsuccessful proposals 67% 33% 3
Total 88% 29% 41
Success in the  Tender
Did not seek further NRM 
funding
Sought further NRM 
funding Total
One successful proposal 3 11 14
One unsuccessful proposal 4 13 17
Multiple proposals, one successful 0 7 7
Multiple unsuccessful proposals 2 1 3
Total 9 32 41
Greiner, R. 
24 
“I would rather just tackle tasks on my own.” R440 
 
Respondents reported varying success to secure funding in subsequent NRM programs.  
“I applied for funding under Reef Rescue together with my neighbour. We got 
funding for a minimum tillage stool splitter. This changed our farming practices 
and made us more aware of the impact of old farming practices.” R412 
“I applied for and got funding for a trash rake.” R221 
“I sought and got funding from Reef Rescue.” R203 
 
Not everybody was successful in their subsequent funding applications: 
“I sought funding for a rotary-hoe type implement, but that was rejected.” R410 
“I tried once or twice to get money, but got knocked back again.” R424 
“I sought funding for a [precision] sprayer, which was also knocked back.” R434 
“Have tried several times to get more funding, but have never since been 
successful. I assumed because I had received the money back then [in the 
Tender].” R202 
“I have sought, but not received any [other funding].” R360  
 
Among subsequent actions and investments by respondents, additional recycle pits featured 
frequently, and machinery to assist with precision agriculture. The size and type of 
investment was not statistically associated with respondents’ success in the Tender. 
Examples of additional investment in water quality improvements—in addition to those 
already mentioned in Section 4.5.1—included: 
“I have put in additional recycling pits and enviro-scan, which helps with 
scheduling of irrigation and reduces deep drainage.” R370 
“I put in zonal tillage, for which I got a water efficiency grant.” R419 
“I have put in recycle drains since.” R427 
“I got funding for a GPS system and some laser levelling four years ago.” R431 
“I have bought a stool splitter and done wetland restoration, all on my own.” R432 
“I have done quite a bit off my own bat, including catching tail water.” R436 
“I have done quite a number: I bought a GPS and legume planter. I put in a 
pipeline and automated irrigation. I have set up the farm so it's easier to run.” 
R542 
“We put in pipelines, laser levelling, bought minimum tillage equipment and new 
fertilizer applicator.” R202 
“Put in another recycle pit, pipeline, GPS, trickle irrigation.” R208 
“We do continuous water sampling. We built more water captures, and recycling 
pits. We spent $2.5 million.” R203 
“Put in another recycle pit, got a micro-organism spray and went certified 
organic.” R204 
“Stool splitter, GPS, more pipelines for better control of irrigation scheduling.” 
R209 
“We have put in two recycle pits since, all off our own bat.” R211 
“Long list: Installed drop irrigation; adopted fertilizer sub-surface application; 
increased efficiency of pumping; moved to certified organic farming on part of the 
farm.” R212 
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“We have improved the farming system further, have implemented minimum 
tillage.” R214 
“We spent $400,000 on water quality improvements—all our own money. I 
replaced concrete pipes and generated large water savings. I am monitoring 
water outflow.” R360 
“More recycle pits, bed forming.” R362 
“More recycle pits. Runoff monitoring.” R363 
“Built more recycle pits off my own bat, legume planter, GPS.” R366 
“I inserted GPS guidance and recently installed moisture sensors, which I am 
now in the process of calibrating.” R367 
“Bean planter, variable rate fertilizer, variable rate sprayer, GPS, minimum tillage 
system, zonal tillage, controlled traffic.” R368 
“I am putting a second [recycle] pit in right now.” R369 
“We have upgraded machinery, most of which relates to water quality.” R410 
“I built another pit, for which I got a small amount of funding from Reef Rescue, 
which is now 10 acres of wetlands.” R416 
“We have put in more recycle pits, all off our own bat. We have a policy of zero 
outfall from the farm. All our land is mapped, laser levelled and graded.” R564 
 
There were fewer examples of respondents undertaking other NRM and conservation 
activities (Table 11). Among actions undertaken were: 
“I did some wetland regeneration.” R212 
“I have planted trees on my cattle property and created a wetlands sanctuary.” 
R362 
“Riparian rehabilitation: I planted trees and fenced if off to keep pigs out. I put in 
20 km electric fences for grazing.” R363. 
 
Great care was taken to take note of any signs to indicate that participation in the Tender 
might have created a dis-incentive for undertaking subsequent water quality improvement or 
NRM activities. None were found. Respondents who had their proposals for funding under 
the Tender declined might have been discouraged to participate in other funding programs, 
but not necessarily in undertaking water quality improvement measures of their own. 
“At the time it was all new to me. I got very disheartened when my proposal got 
knocked back. After getting knocked back, I swore I would never go into a 
scheme like that again. I haven't involved myself in any more grants.  [..]  I have 
bought a stool splitter and done wetland restoration, all on my own.” R432 
“We have put in more recycle pits, all off our own bat. We have a policy of zero 
outfall from the farm. All our land is mapped, laser levelled and graded.” R564 
 
4.5.4 Stated intention to participate in the Reef Trust Tender—Burdekin  
At the time when the survey was conducted, preparations and landholder consultations had 
been ongoing in the Lower Burdekin as part of the rollout of a competitive tender program 
targeted at reducing nitrogen discharge from sugar cane farms in the Burdekin catchment. A 
question was included in the survey to ascertain respondents’ intentions to participate in this 
new tender program.  
 
Greiner, R. 
26 
Approximately one quarter of respondents were unsure of their intentions, they either had not 
heard about the tender or were unsure of the details. Of those respondents who had made 
up their minds, only one in four intended to submit an expression of interest (Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Stated intention to participate in Reef Trust Tender—Burdekin (proportion of respondents, %) 
 
 
 
Reasons for a positive intention were focused on reducing financial risk from anticipated yield 
decline associated with a reduction in fertilizer application, and receiving funding for new 
precision farming machinery. The following comments illustrate key points made: 
“I have scope for reducing N. I look at it as reducing the financial risk of applying 
less N from potential production loss. I will put in an EOI and think about the 
detail later.” R366 
“There are a few things I would like to change on the farm. I may adopt a new 
system if I can get some funding to reduce the risk. I am not prepared to spend 
my own money to change my farming system at this point in time.” R416 
“I have been considering buying a stool splitter—I have not been happy with a 
contractor and also not with the machine I hired, but would buy a new one if I can 
get funding.” R416 
 
Reasons for a negative intention were focused on the perceived scope and specifications of 
the new tender. A commonly raised concern was that the tender appeared to be aimed at 
those farmers who were applying fertilizer in excess of industry best practice, which 
disqualified many respondents from participating. Others were concerned that reducing 
fertilizer application would compromise cane yield. The following comments illustrate key 
points made: 
“We already use less than their nominated amount of N.” R360 
“I looked into it. I am already below the benchmark.” R362 
“My fertilizer rates are at 200 [kg N/ha] already. The process seems to be 
targeted at growers who still use around 240 [kg N/ha].” R368 
“Industry leaders have long reduced N rates. It is no good over-fertilizing; it's a 
waste of money. We need to re-look at all N and P rates.” R363 
“I have already reduced my N rates. I run at 180. I can't come down lower without 
sacrificing yield.” R209 
“Unfortunately, the Reverse Tender is a purely volume-based program. I am an 
early adopter apply fertilizer at below the 6-easy-steps recommendations (130-
180kg N) but have generally higher production. The Reverse Tender program is a 
crazy way of doing it [reductions]. It's just all about statistics. There will be no 
incentive for ongoing change.” R429 
“The focus of this tender is all wrong. It won't achieve anything: It won't help 
producers increase productivity without causing environmental harm, and it's not 
Response Proportion of respondents (%)
"No" 57%
"Yes" 19%
"Unsure" 24%
Total 100%
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best for taxpayers. It's a one-size-fits-all and doesn't consider the soil 
characteristics.” R203 
“It's is not fair. It's only for the blokes who have not yet reduced their N 
application.” R204 
“I had ideas but they did not fit the guidelines.” R424 
“I don't like the concept of restricting nitrogen use.” R217 
“I looked into it. It's not beneficial. Reducing N by that much results in yield loss.” 
R419 
“This [tender] is bureaucracy running riot.” R564 
 
No statistically significant associations of intended participation were detected with any of the 
socio-demographic covariates, or success in or satisfaction with the Tender. 
 
 
4.6 Respondent suggestions 
The final question of the survey asked respondents their ideas and recommendations about 
the best ways for government to improve the health of the GBR.  
 
Some respondents called on government to continue incentivising on-farm actions in favour 
of regulatory approaches. They also pointed out the need for tailoring of on-ground actions: 
“More people would go for it [take WQ action on their farms] if there was more 
funding. Low interest loans are also important. More people would do recycle 
pits. It would be more viable.” R202 
“Invest more money in farmers, and you will get [Reef] health benefits.” R431 
“Help fund more recycle pits. They are the only sure way of reducing runoff, and 
therefore N and herbicide and pesticide runoff. People have done the pits that 
make money. They need assistance with the [financially] marginal ones, 
particularly while cane prices are low.” R366 
“More money, more grants would get more people moving. If there is money 
involved, people will want to get involved.” R436 
“Continue Reef Rescue. Funding helps farmers modernise infrastructure. Many 
farmers would not be able to afford better machinery which helps improve water 
quality.” R209 
“Need to actively encourage water recycling and reduction of farm runoff to 
minimise [sediment/nutrient/chemical] export. But there is no one-size-fits-all. 
Different areas need to be treated differently, depending on soils and slope.” 
R203 
“Avoid regulation and penalties. There should be encouragement for farmers to 
adopt best practice. Financially support the on-ground change that you 
[government] think is required.” R416 
 
Respondents emphasised the role of education—of farmers and the community more 
generally—in achieving intrinsically motivated behavioural change. They expressed a 
preference for education over regulatory approaches. They also pointed to the need for more 
research: 
“Encouraging and educating farmers is the best strategy. As they say, you catch 
more flies with honey.” R215 
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“All regulation is about is to make it happen today. If you educate people and 
they understand WHY—the consequences of their actions—they will want to do 
the right thing. If you regulate, you will always require strong audits so that people 
don't regress.” R429 
“Need to find tools to measure [outcomes] accurately. Show people the results of 
their farming practices. 99 out of 100 [farmers] will change if you can demonstrate 
the [environmental] benefit.” R203 
“Education of everyone is the key, farmers AND townspeople.” R217 
“There needs to be an ever increasing education program about management of 
land across rural and urban communities.” R429 
“More research is needed, and more funding to help farmers control runoff.” R222 
“There are a few pig-headed farmers, but not many. You don't have to hit us with 
a stick. If something is causing harm, show us, give us proof, and we will change. 
We want the Reef to be there.” R366 
“I think they need to put it in plain English to farmers how practices affect water 
quality. I have nitrates in my water yet I put on less N than recommended and 
have higher-than-average yields. So how do I control that [nitrate]? R368 
 
Respondents stressed the importance government consulting with industry. They 
emphasised the role of industry initiatives to improve productivity, and the environmental 
spin-offs, and pointed out that it was important to acknowledge the industry’s environmental 
achievements. They also pointed to the opportunity provided by generational change in the 
industry: 
“We need for the 'good news stories' to get out there, about Catalyst, Reef 
Guardian, Reef Rescue.” R429 
“Continue to work with industry.” R410 
“The BMP process in grazing and cane should be embraced by government. 
BMP is aiding businesses and helping the environment.” R202 
“Farmers are trying to reduce sediment. [Government needs to] open [its] eyes to 
what farmers are really trying to do.” R370 
“The average age of cane farmers in this district is well above 60 years. They 
don't want to change what they do. They haven't done any paperwork in 50 years 
and why would they want to start doing it now?” R368 
“Generational change: support the change.” R429 
 
Respondents called for more grass-roots engagement in the development of policies and 
programs, and an appreciation of the realities of deriving a living from farming: 
“Need to listen to farmers' perspective a lot more, on the ground, farmers in the 
field, not just the peak organisations, to appreciate the position that farmers are 
in.” R211 
“Our [farmer] experience is very different from those of people who look at things 
through the computer. R424 
“Make the science that informs policy and shapes public opinion available to the 
agricultural community, then let's have a discussion, then we can decide a 
coordinated way forward. This needs an inclusive approach rather than an 
imposed process. R367 
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Some respondents acknowledged that regulation could play a role, too, provided it was 
designed in a sympathetic manner: 
“We need carrots and sticks. Regulation should drive growers to sign up to the 
BMP process.” R370 
“We still have 20% cowboys in the industry. It will take regulation to bring them in 
line, but not too heavy handed—not like the previous Labour government!” R420 
“Live on and run a farm for 12 months—then bring in the regulations!” R542 
 
A consistent message was the perceived need for a comprehensive approach to pollution, 
which was not solely focussed on diffuse pollution from farms but also addressed urban and 
industrial pollution: 
“Farmers are [policy] takers. We get frustrated because historically we are easy 
targets. We get blamed when blatantly big business including mines and cities 
must play a big part, too. Mines in particular seem to be getting preferential 
treatment because of the financial contribution they are making.” R412 
“We need to all work together, farmers and the community as a whole.” R204 
“It's a community problem. The cost burden needs to be shared, not just borne by 
farmers.” R214 
“Don't just look at the farmers, look at urban and industrial also. More can be 
done with water recycling, in particular of urban effluent.” R363 
“Farmers are singled out because they are an easy target. We need food and 
people have to live. People and cities have impacts, too.” R427 
“What happens with all the sewage from the towns and cities along the east 
coast? Why do they always pick on agriculture? What about the discharge from 
mines? I see dirty water running past my property after rain, which comes from 
cattle properties. What about fish farms? Their discharge water is black when it 
goes out. I can't see any dirt leaving my farm.” R369 
“What about the herbicides that come off ships hulls [antifoulants] and those used 
in urban gardens and parks?” R366 
“Control runoff from the cities.” R432 
 
Other respondents noted the imperative to tackle climate change to safeguard the GBR: 
“There are different factors affecting the Reef. Climate change in the long term is 
likely to destroy the Reef. If climate change is not addressed through emission 
reduction, what we are doing [about water quality] won't help.” R450 
“They should be controlling greenhouse gases more. Climate change is the real 
threat to the reef.” R434 
“Don't forget about climate change. What are we doing as a nation to combat 
climate change?” R370 
 
There was a message that farmers cared, for the Reef and for their families: 
“I snorkel with the fish out on the reef and it just blows my mind every time.” R427 
“I enjoy the Reef. My kids love it. We want them [kids] to enjoy it. […] We [locals] 
use the Reef the most. We want to protect it the most. Every farmer has a boat. 
All go to the Reef.” R362 
“Our family has been here for 80 years and we want to be here for another 80 
years.” R211 
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5 DISCUSSION 
This project undertook an ex-post evaluation of a NRM program, which had allocated funding 
for on-farm projects delivering water quality improvements through a competitive tender 
process. The 2008 Lower Burdekin Water Quality Tender was the first program of this type to 
be undertaken in the GBR catchment.  
 
For the ex-post evaluation, a structured survey was conducted of 42 Tender participants, 
including 22 who had submitted successful bids and 20 whose bids had been unsuccessful. 
Respondents had submitted a total of 64 bids of which 22 had been successful. 
Respondents and their bids provided a good statistical fit with the Tender participants and 
bids.  
 
The communications and mixed-mode survey approach taken successfully met the challenge 
of maximising survey participation from the small sample frame of Tender participants, 
securing a response rate of 93% of those who could be contacted. This was an exceptionally 
high response rate (Dillman et al., 2009), which also reflects favourably on Tender 
participants’ memories of the program. It further serves to maximise the credibility of 
research results (Baruch and Holtom, 2008).  
 
The sample was sufficiently large to allow descriptive analysis of structured response data 
and ‘adequate’ from the perspective of qualitative research to achieve informational 
redundancy. The methodological approach also effectively addressed potential data quality 
issues relating to the 7-year time lapse between the Tender and this research by maximising 
respondents’ factual recall of the Tender. 
 
The research found that the vast majority of investments contracted under and co-funded by 
the Tender had been implemented as proposed. In particular, all acquisitions of machinery to 
support precision farming and reduce water quality impacts had been completed, and the 
equipment was said to be being used as intended. Similarly, all new or modified recycle pits 
co-funded by the Tender were said to be working well and to the satisfaction of landholders, 
with one exception only. By achieving implementation of long-lasting improvements to land 
and water management, the Tender has proven to have been effective in achieving water 
quality improvements. 
 
However, the Tender did not achieve its potential allocative effectiveness. It fell short of 
instigating all approved activities and achieving the associated water quality benefits, which 
had been as anticipated by the metric underlying the assessment of proposals (Greiner et al., 
2008; Rolfe et al., 2011b). There was also evidence of infrastructure failure: One of the 
recycle pits that was constructed did not perform as intended and therefore delivered neither 
the anticipated water quality benefits nor the financial benefits that the landholder had hoped 
for. There was evidence of incomplete works: Another recycle pit was not fully completed 
and therefore lacked full functionality. In both cases the Tender funding clearly did not 
achieve the anticipated water quality benefit and was consequently neither effective nor 
efficient. Further, several proposed infrastructure projects did not proceed despite having 
been approved for funding: Construction of two recycle pits and one irrigation system did not 
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go ahead because either cost or technical assumptions in the proposals had proven false. As 
a result the opportunity to achieve water quality improvements was lost.  
 
In terms of efficiency of the other investments, the research provides direct and indirect 
evidence of additionality, which enhanced the efficiency of the Tender. The Tender attracted 
proposals for water quality improvements which would not otherwise have been 
contemplated. The funding ensured that at least some investments proceeded which could 
not be afforded by landholders without external financial assistance. 
 
The research delivers direct and indirect evidence of crowding in effects, which enhanced the 
efficiency of the Tender. The vast majority of Tender participants proceeded to undertake a 
variety of subsequent investments into water quality improvement activities—irrespective of 
whether they had received Tender funding or not. Many respondents reported to have gained 
a better understanding about the effects of agriculture on water quality as a result of 
participating in the Tender, which enhanced their intrinsic motivation to do more for water 
quality. For many of the successful Tender participants, the Tender investment helped them 
to change their entire farming system to be more environmentally benign. The research did 
not find any evidence of crowding out, but did find that most Tender participants continued to 
participate in NRM programs in the hope of securing funding for water quality improvement 
action or, to a lesser extent, other conservation activities. 
 
The research illustrates that the Tender also served an education function beyond the realm 
of Tender participants. The majority of investments were inspected by other landholders 
and/or extension officers following their implementation. Field inspections are known to 
contribute to the diffusion of innovations (Somers, 1998). As many of the proposals funded 
by the Tender, in particular recycle pits and precision agriculture machinery, were novel in 
the Lower Burdekin, the Tender therefore served to progress the adoption of water quality 
improvement innovations. 
 
The ex-post evaluation reveals that Tender participants were overwhelmingly satisfied with 
the way the Tender was implemented. What stood out in respondents’ recollections were the 
one-on-one consultations they received from technical personnel in discussing and tailoring 
their expressions of interest, and translating their ideas into costed Tender proposals. The 
research results indicate that in many cases the budgets underestimated true investment 
costs. In most cases, this did not affect implementation of successful proposals as farmers 
were willing to bear the additional cost. In some cases, however, cost misspecification led to 
successful proposals being abandoned and potential water quality benefits being foregone. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of competitive tenders relies on the accurate quantification 
of opportunity costs of investment, and the variation of opportunity between agricultural 
producers, and across industries, catchments and pollutants (Rolfe and Windle, 2011). 
Consequently cost misspecification can fundamentally undermine the efficiency of tenders. 
 
The ex-post evaluation reveals that Tender participants were overwhelmingly dissatisfied 
with the transparency of the selection process and the way the Tender results were 
communicated. While successful Tender participants were happy that they received funding, 
they remained unsure on what basis their proposals had been selected. Unsuccessful 
Tender participants in particular expressed frustration with not understanding the reasons 
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why their proposals had not been selected, and not understanding why others had been 
successful. 
 
Tender participants were not very inclined to participate in a new tender program being 
offered in the Lower Burdekin, the Reef Trust Tender—Burdekin. The new tender program 
was generally regarded as being targeted at late adopters of established industry best 
practice, and many respondents questioned the rationale of financially incentivising laggards. 
Few saw how the new guidelines could help them improve their farming systems. In 
comparison, the 2008 Tender had been targeted at facilitating the adoption of (then) 
innovative water quality improvements. 
 
Tender participants expressed views which support a diverse government policy approach to 
water quality improvement in the GBR. Respondents views mirrored scientists’ calls for 
incentive instruments to be tailored to specific situations based on the characteristics of the 
pollutants and polluters, and the underlying ecological process (Greiner, 2014; Kroeger and 
Casey, 2007). There was hope that financial support programs would continue, particularly to 
reduce innovation risk for early adopters, and that preference would be given to education-
based policy over regulation. This reflected a belief in education being able to generate 
intrinsic motivation for water quality protection by farmers, and a preference for positive over 
negative external motivators. However, there was support for some regulation to ensure a 
more comprehensive level of adoption of industry best practice standards for land and water 
management.  
 
There were also calls for, firstly, a more comprehensive approach to water pollution 
reduction, involving non-agricultural industries and urban pollution, and, secondly, climate 
change action to stem the threat to the GBR arising from multiple detrimental effects of 
climate change.   
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
The ex-post evaluation of the 2008 Lower Burdekin Water Quality Tender yielded a series of 
relevant insights, which can help judge the program and elicit lessons for future tender-based 
NRM programs as well as NRM policy more generally.  
 
The research established a high level of persistence of investment with all but one of the 
funded works and all machines and other implements being operational seven years after the 
Tender. This means that the benefits to water quality continue to accrue beyond the 5-year 
period, which was considered in the assessment metric used to rate and rank proposals to 
the Tender.   
 
The Tender achieved additionality and crowding-in effects, which improved the efficiency of 
the investment. In particular, the research provided evidence that the Tender: 
§ Incentivised the participation of many farmers who had not previously done anything 
about water quality or participated in any NRM programs; 
§ Effected learning about the impacts of agriculture on water quality—irrespective of 
success of proposals—and thereby generated intrinsic motivation for many Tender 
participants to be wanting to do more about improving water quality; 
§ Sparked a series of subsequent investments into water quality improvements, many 
of which were entirely funded by the farmers while others were undertaken with the 
assistance of other NRM funding programs; and  
§ Triggered and/or facilitated farming-systems change to more environmentally benign 
practices in some instances. 
 
The Tender did, however, fail to achieve its anticipated effectiveness (total pollution abated) 
because some major projects which had been approved for funding did not proceed. While 
this resulted in cost savings, it also resulted in forgone water quality improvements. The 
principal reason for this was cost under-estimation during proposal preparation. 
 
The research illustrated that the Tender’s focus on information, education and one-on-one 
engagement with Tender participants in the preparation of proposals generated high levels of 
participant satisfaction. However, the same level of transparency and communication was 
not maintained after project selection, which resulted in some level of frustration and possibly 
diminished potential additionality and crowding-in effects.  
 
The learnings from the research can be summarised into a series of recommendations to 
inform, firstly, the design and implementation of future competitive tenders, NRM programs 
and NRM policy, and secondly, future research. The following provides a listing of 
recommendations and articulation of the underlying rationales. 
 
§ Systematically build ex-post evaluations into all competitive tenders—indeed all NRM 
programs—by (1) stipulating the requirements in program guidelines, (2) allocating 
necessary funding and (3) compelling participation of program participants. Lessons 
can be learnt from all programs and a systematically assembled body of evidence is 
more useful than an eclectic mix of ex-post evaluations. Statistical strength of data 
sets increases with sample size, and response rate is particularly critical when the 
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sample frame is small (as is the case in this research). Flagging future evaluations 
during program implementation and contractually committing successful participants 
to participating in subsequent research can be helpful. Ensuring ethical conduct of 
research to safeguard program participants’ anonymity and confidentiality of 
responses. 
 
§ Ensure ex-post evaluations cover participants’ experiences with all aspects of 
process as well as effectiveness, allocative efficiency of funding and legacy—in 
particular ongoing incentive, additionality and crowding effects. Use structured survey 
and a combination of quantitative information for statistical rigor and qualitative 
information for narrative/illustration and depth of insights.  
 
§ Conduct two ex-post evaluations of a program, the first not long after program 
completion as participants’ memory recall diminishes with time. The first ex-post 
evaluation can deliver high-quality insights into program participants’ experiences 
with all stages of the program. The second ex-post evaluation, maybe three to five 
years after completion of the program, can explore longer-term additionality and 
crowding-in effects. The combined analysis of all data sets will maximise insights into 
program effectiveness and legacy.  
 
§ Complement ex-post program evaluations with research, which enables comparison 
of program participants with farmers who have not participated. Only by having an 
external reference group to compare program participants with is it possible to 
quantify the additionality and crowding effects achieved by a program.  
 
§ Treat funding program information sessions as an opportunity for educating 
landholders about the conservation issue at hand. Share the science. New 
understanding generates intrinsic motivation to ‘do the right thing’, which crowds in 
environmentally beneficial actions.  
 
§ Provide technical advice for bid development and maximise accuracy and realism of 
technical and costing assumptions. Bids are the corner stone of opportunity cost 
assessment in environmental tenders. Incorrect costing may lead to unrealistic bids. If 
wrong costing results in cost overestimation and bids are too high, proposals may be 
disadvantaged in the order of merit and may be eliminated from funding. If costs are 
underestimated and bids are too low, proposed actions may not proceed due to cost 
overruns. Poor costs specification may also cause some disillusionment with some 
successful participants, and acting negatively with respect to participation in future 
programs. 
 
§ Maximise transparency of process and communication of funding decisions, in both 
positive and negative funding outcomes. Proponents have invested time and effort, 
and often money, into developing proposals. They have earned the right to receive a 
detailed explanation why their proposal was funded, or what were the reason(s) why 
their proposal did not receive funding. This interaction presents a further opportunity 
for the program to generate learning and generate intrinsic motivation.   
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§ When implementing competitive tenders, be prepared to deal with situations where 
participants struggle to implement approved activities. The first priority should be to 
offer assistance to try to overcome impediments to implementation. The second 
priority is to reallocate unused funding based on a contingency plan to allocate such 
funding to bids down the order of merit. While there may be a loss of theoretical 
allocative efficiency associated with this strategy, it provides a second-best solution 
by ensuring that program funding realises the maximum environmental benefit it can.  
 
§ Review the appropriate use of approved funding, and help proponents overcome 
difficulties with implementation and problems with functionality. While adding to the 
transaction costs of program implementation, overcoming technical difficulties can 
prevent efficiency loss caused by partial implementation or malfunction of the 
investment. 
 
§ Consider changes to environmental regulation as part of a comprehensive and 
systematic approach to environmental policy (Greiner, 2014). Regulation is a 
necessary foundation for well-functioning MBIs, and it can also provide a powerful 
external motivator for prevention of unwanted environmental behaviour, provided 
criteria of effective regulatory design are met (Greiner et al., 2016).  
 
§ Engage with industry at a grass-roots level in the design of new policies and 
programs. Insights can be gleaned that maximise program/policy effectiveness and 
efficiency by reducing the likelihood of causing unintended consequences and 
maximising industry acceptance and collaboration. 
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8 APPENDICES 
8.1 Appendix 1: Information sheet and informed consent form 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
PROJECT TITLE: “Legacy of the Lower Burdekin Water Quality Tender”   
 
You are invited to take part in a research project about the Water Quality Tender, which was conducted in 
the Lower Burdekin region in 2008, and in which you participated.  
 
The research seeks to establish whether the investments made into water quality improvements in 2008 
have had a lasting effect and explore the how this is so—or the reasons why there may not be a lasting 
effect.  It also invites any feedback you may wish to provide about the 2008 Water Quality Tender. 
 
The study is conducted by Prof. Romy Greiner from James Cook University in collaboration with NQ Dry 
Tropics, which administered the 2008 Water Quality Tender.  
 
If you participated in the 2008 Water Quality Tender, you are invited to be participate in this research 
through an interview.  The interview should only take approximately 3/4 hour of your time. The researcher 
will visit you on your farm, or meet you at a place preferred by you, on a date and at a time nominated by 
you.   
 
Taking part in this study is completely voluntary and you can stop taking part in the study at any time 
without explanation or prejudice.  
 
Your responses and contact details will be strictly confidential. The data from the study will be used in 
research publications and a report to the National Environmental Science Program’s Tropical Water Quality 
Hub. You will not be identified in any way in these publications. 
 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact the Principal Investigator.  
 
Principal Investigator: 
Prof. Romy Greiner 
The Cairns Institute 
James Cook University 
Mobile: 0418 242 156 
Email: romy.greiner@jcu.edu.au 
 
 
If you have any concerns regarding the ethical conduct of the study, please contact: 
Human Ethics, Research Office 
James Cook University, Townsville, Qld, 4811  
Phone: (07) 4781 5011 (ethics@jcu.edu.au) 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:   Prof. Romy Greiner  
PROJECT TITLE:   Legacy of the Lower Burdekin Water Quality Tender 
COLLEGE:   The Cairns Institute 
 
 
I understand that the aim of this research study is “to establish whether there have been lasting 
benefits generated by the investments made into water quality improvements through the Water 
Quality Tender in 2008”. 
 
I consent to participate in this project, the details of which have been explained to me, and I have 
been provided with a written information sheet to keep. 
 
I understand that my participation will involve a half-hour interview and I agree that the researcher 
may use the results as described in the information sheet 
 
I acknowledge that: 
 
§ taking part in this study is voluntary and I am aware that I can stop taking part in it at any time 
without explanation or prejudice and withdraw any unprocessed data I have provided; 
§ any information I give will be kept strictly confidential and that no names will be used to identify 
me with this study without my approval. 
 
I consent to be interviewed  Yes  No 
 
 
 
Name (printed): …………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Signature:………………………………………………..Date:………………………….. 
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8.2 Appendix 2: Pre-survey letter mailed to Tender participants 
 
 
 
 
15 October 2015 
 
«First_name» «Surname» 
«Postal_address» 
«Suburb»  «State»  «Postcode» 
 
 
Dear «First_name», 
 
Your experience matters, your opinion counts 
 
In 2008, NQ Dry Tropics (then: Burdekin Dry Tropics) ran a water quality tender in the 
Lower Burdekin.  You were an integral part to this ground breaking event because you 
submitted a bid and proposed to implement activities on your property to help improve 
water quality. 
 
We are now asking you to cast your mind back to your experience with the Tender, and to 
share these recollections with independent researchers.  
 
NQ Dry Tropics and the James Cook University’s Dr Romy Greiner are combining efforts 
to review the experiences of participants in the 2008 tender.  Funding has been made 
available by the National Environmental Science Program to interview participants.  The 
research is very important because the experiences of participants will help inform future 
investments, including a nutrient tender that is being rolled out by NQ Dry Tropics in the 
lower Burdekin over the next few months. The way in which this current tender is 
administered can greatly benefit from your experiences with the earlier 2008 tender. 
 
This letter is to inform you to expect to receive a phone call from Romy, who will ask 
whether you are willing to participate in the review.  Participation is entirely voluntary; 
however, I would be very grateful for your input and the opportunity to learn from your 
experiences. 
 
Romy was involved in the tender design and subsequent assessment of proposals in the 
2008 tender. Romy is now an adjunct professor with James Cook University and has an 
excellent track record of scientific research conducted in collaboration with farmers and 
graziers.  She is highly respected by clients, stakeholders and other researchers for her 
ethical conduct, and the integrity and quality of her work.  
 
If your tender proposal in 2008 received funding, Romy will ask to visit you to conduct a 
30-45 minute face-to-face interview at a time convenient to you.  If your proposal in 2008 
did not receive funding, Romy will ask to have a 15 minute chat over the telephone.  If you 
did not participate in the 2008 Tender and receive a phone call, it indicates that the 
previous owner of your property was a participant and Romy would like to have chat about 
the legacy of the activity undertaken by your predecessor. 
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I want to personally assure you that: 
• participation in this research is entirely voluntary; 
• your consent will be sought before any questions are asked; 
• information about your participation in the 2008 Water Quality Tender, and your 
responses to this survey are entirely confidential and anonymous. The research is 
subject to protocols of ethical conduct of research, which means that data will only 
be accessible to Dr Greiner, only aggregate data will be published, and any verbal 
quotations will not be attributed to you personally;  
• the research is extremely valuable because it is the first time that somebody 
explores the legacy of this type of investment in the Great Barrier Reef region.  
 
If you have any concerns or questions about the project, you are welcome to contact Paul 
Duncanson, who was the administrating officer during the 2008 Tender, or Dave Olsen, 
from our sugar team, on telephone 4724 3544. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Scott Crawford 
CEO 
NQ Dry Tropics 
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8.3 Appendix 3: Questionnaire of successful Tender participants 
Note: The visual layout of the questionnaire was altered for inclusion in the report. 
1. On a scale from 1 to 5, how clearly do you think you recall the Tender and its outcomes?  
 Do not Remember Remember   Remember    Remember  
 remember vaguely some detail   most aspects     clearly 
 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Was this the first time you were wanting to undertake a WQ improvement activity?  
     □1  Yes      □2  No       □3  Cannot recall 
   
3. Was this the first time you participated in a NRM program?  
     □1  Yes      □2  No       □3  Cannot recall 
   
4. To what extent did you implement the proposed/contracted investment?  
 Did not  Implemented        Implemented  
 implement  partially        in full 
 0 25 50 75 100% 
Proposal [investment] Funded Completion rate 
………………………………..  Y/N     % 
………………………………..  Y/N     %  
………………………………..  Y/N     % 
Respondents with successful proposals only    [other: go to Q9] 
5. Was the  [investment]  completed within the nominated cost?  
     □1  Yes      □2  No     □3  Cannot recall 
   
6. On a scale from 1 to 5, how satisfied are you with the performance of the  [investment]  
?  
 Extremely        Extremely  
 dissatisfied          satisfied 
 1 2 3 4 5 
   
7. Have other people (farmers, extension people) ever inspected the  [investment]?  
  □1  Yes      □2  No  
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8. Has the  [investment]  generated a financial benefit for the farm? 
  □1  Yes    □2  No  
   
All respondents  
9. If you could go back in time, would you change your proposal? 
      □1  Yes      □2  No     
   
10. Were you generally satisfied with the way the WQ Tender was run? 
      □1  Yes      □2  No      □3  Neither    □4  Unsure     
   
Were you generally satisfied with the way the outcomes of the Tender were explained? 
      □1  Yes      □2  No      □3  Neither    □4  Unsure     
   
Were there any aspects that you particularly liked?  
   
Were there any aspects that you particularly disliked?  
   
11. Has participation in the Tender changed your understanding about the relationship 
between agriculture and water quality? 
   □1  Yes      □2  No  
   
12. Has participation in the Tender changed the way you do things on your property, or 
anything else? 
        □1  Yes      □2  No  
   
13. Have you undertaken other investments into water quality improvements since 2008?  
    □1  Yes      □2  No  
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14. Have you undertaken other NRM activities since 2008? 
   □1  Yes      □2  No  
   
15. Have you sought or received funding from other NRM programs since 2008?  
  □1  Yes      □2  No  
   
16. Do you intend to participate in the upcoming Nitrogen (Reverse) Tender in the Lower 
Burdekin?   
  □1  Yes      □2  No      □3  Uncertain     
   
17. Thinking back to the 2008 Tender, were there aspects that you particularly disliked? 
18. What is your age group?  
□1  < 30 years   
□2 30-39 years          
□3  40-49 years          
□4  50-59 years          
□5  60-69 years          
□6  70 years and older    
19. What is your gender?         □1  male     □2 female    
20. What is the area size of the property? ……......… acres  OR  ………...… hectares   
21. What is the ownership structure of the property?  
□1  family owned  
□2 corporation owned    
□3 other: (specify)…………………………………………………… 
22. How long have you/your family owned the property?  
□1 less than 10 years         
□2  10-19 years         
□3 20-39 years 
□4 40 years and more 
23. What are the land uses?  
□1  sugar cane area………….. 2014 average crop yield…………. 
□2 other crops area…………..  (specify)…………………………………………………… 
□3 fallow area…………..   
□4 grazing area…………..   
□5 wetlands area…………..   
□6 other area…………..  (specify)…………………………………………………… 
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24. Which of the following education and training options have you completed?  
□1  Primary school  
□2  High school 
□3  Tertiary education—relevant to agriculture 
□4  Tertiary education—other 
□5 Training and Cert course(s) relevant to agriculture  
□6 Land and water ‘best management’ course(s) 
□7 DPI / BSES(SRA) or similar course(s)  
25. Do you go fishing/boating on the Reef?         □1  yes     □0  no  
26. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
Please rate your level of (DIS) AGREEMENT on a scale from 1 to 5.    
 Strongly Somewhat Neither agree   Somewhat   Strongly  
 disagree disagree nor disagree   agree     agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. I understand the science which explains the link between farming,  
water quality and health of the Great Barrier Reef.   
2. Farmers and other businesses who operate in the GBR catchment  
have a duty of care to the Reef.   
3. Many farming and land use practices are causing increased 
levels of sediments, nutrients and pesticides.   
4. The wetlands and waterways in the Lower Burdekin are in good health.   
5. Water quality is a minor threat to the GBR compared to other pressures 
such as climate change, crow-of-thorn star fish, shipping, etc.   
6. Farmers should be left alone to get on with growing crops and food. They  
should not have to worry about the environment.     
7. Scientists exaggerate the threat that bad water quality poses to the Reef.   
8. It is important that governments invest public money to help farmers  
improve the way they operate and manage the land.   
9. Water quality is a talking point among farmers.   
10. Governments are not investing enough money and effort in water quality 
and the GBR.   
11. Contributing to water quality improvements (through making on-farm changes) 
makes me feel good about myself.    
12. There is a need for some environmental regulation, and penalties for non- 
compliance, to ensure that all farmers are “doing the right thing” by the GBR.   
13. *There is more that I can do on my property to improve water quality.   
27. If there was one recommendation that you could give to the Qld and Australian 
Governments about improving the health of the GBR, what would it be?  
   
End of Survey.  Thank you very much for your time and collaboration! J 
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